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This paper incorporates a classical moral hazard problem with unobserved
worker effort and bonus payments into a competitive search equilibrium environ-
mentwith risk averse workers. Theresulting framework permits an analysis ofthe
effects of labour market competition and search frictions on individual contract
setting. The paper demonstrates that the classical model of moral hazard with an
ex-post wage setting regime may underestimate the optimal values of wages and
bonus payments in competitive labour markets. The baseline model is extended
to account for employer heterogeneity with respect to capital endowments. In
the extended model, wage competition between employers serves as a source of
positive correlation between wages and bonus payments reported in a number of
empirical studies.
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11 Introduction
Labour contracts with bonus payments and proﬁt shares are widely used to address the
issues of employee motivation and asymmetric information, such as the moral hazard
problem. A large branch of the literature considers these issues in the context of a
single match between a ﬁrm and a worker independently of labour market conditions.
The general framework for models with bonus payments in the presence of moral haz-
ard is partial equilibrium with an ex-post wage setting mechanism where ﬁrms make
take-it-or-leave wage offers after they meet a potential employee (see section IV in
Laffont and Martimort (2002) and section I in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)).
The classical contract theory approach provides foundations for the analysis of risk-
sharing and employee motivation in a match with stochastic output and unobserved
worker behavior. Yet, a deeper analysis of incentive contracts under different labour
market regimes is required. This necessity is also supported by a number of empiri-
cal studies providing mixed evidence on the correlation between bonus payments and
wages under different labour market conditions (see table 1). In particular, studies
by Hart and Hübler (1991) and Cahuc and Dormont (1997) ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive
correlation between wages and bonus payments in Germany and France respectively
indicating complementarity between these two variables in Continental Europe. In
contrast, a study by Wadhwani and Wall (1990) reports independence between these
two types of labour compensation in the UK, while Kaufman (1998) ﬁnds evidence of
a negative correlation, indicating substitution, for the set of companies in the US.
In this paper, ﬁrst, the classical model on performance related pay in the presence
of moral hazard is extended to the case of heterogeneous jobs in a dynamic labour
market equilibrium framework with search frictions. However, the core of the moral
hazard model is unchanged, the model characterizes a situation where workers pos-
sess private information about their effort choices affecting the probability distribution
of output. Based on this extension, it is illustrated that the classical contract theory
model with the ex-post wage setting mechanism fails to explain the complementarity
effect between wages and bonus payments observed in a number of empirical stud-
ies. Motivated by this result the current study develops a new model of moral hazard
in competitive search equilibrium with risk averse workers and improves the existing
approach.
2Study Result Details No. of observations
Mitchell D.J.B., Complements Bonus payments are positively N=3428
Lewin D., US, 1974 associated with total Cross-section
Lawler, E.E. (1990) compensation and base wage Individual level
Hart R.A., Complements Wages are positively N=3628
Hübler O. (1991) Germany, 1984 associated with probability Cross-section
and amount of proﬁt shares Individual level
Wadhwani S., Independent Proﬁt shares are positively NT=900
Wall M. (1990) UK, 1974-1982 associated with total Panel data
compensation Firm level
Kaufman R. (1998) Substitutes Bonus payments are positively NT=550
US, 1978-1988 associated with total Panel data
compensation but negatively Firm level
with base wage
Cahuc P., Complements Proﬁt shares are positively NT=688
Dormont B. (1997) France, 1986-1989 associated with Panel data
base wage Firm level
Table 1: Empirical research: wages and bonus payments.
The concept of competitive search has been originally introduced in a study by
Moen (1997) and is based on the dynamic search and matching modeling setup of
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000). The principal difference of
competitive search is the ex-ante wage setting mechanism where ﬁrms post wages for
open vacancies and unemployed workers direct their job search towards the better of-
fers. This mechanism provides foundations for the wage competition between employ-
ers: ﬁrms offering higher wages are more likely to ﬁll their open vacancies as opposed
to the ﬁrms with low wage offers. Competition between ﬁrms provides motives for the
rent-sharing between workers and ﬁrms and explains worker rents as a hiring premium
left by ﬁrms in order to attract a potential employee.
This paper considers competitive search equilibrium with incentive contracts where
jobs are characterized by stochastic output and workers’ unobserved job performance
giving rise to a moral hazard problem. The combination of incentive contracts within
a match and competitive search as the match formation process describe a situation
where ﬁrms pay both the motivation and the hiring premia and the equilibrium is a
counteraction of the risk-sharing and the rent-sharing employer considerations. In the
equilibrium, the risk-sharing curve deﬁnes the optimal proportions of risk-sharing be-
tween the ﬁrm and the worker necessary to provide workers with the correct effort
incentives. While the rent-sharing curve deﬁnes the optimal rent split between the two
3contracting parties necessary to achieve optimal hiring probabilities for the ﬁrm. Ex-
tended for the case of heterogeneous jobs this model deﬁnes the major contribution
of this paper – to show that competitive search equilibrium with performance pay is
capable of explaining complementarity between bonus payments and wages reported
in a number of empirical studies. This complementarity effect is obtained due to the
rent-sharing employer motive absent in the models with an ex-post wage setting.
Another contribution of this paper is comparison of the optimal labour compensation
packages in terms of wages and bonus payments in labour markets with different insti-
tutional setups. This paper demonstrates that the classical model on moral hazard with
risk averse workers predicts lower optimal values of wages and bonus payments than
the labour market model with wage competition between employers.
Finally, this paper extends the constrained efﬁciency result of Hosios (1990) and Moen
and Rosen (2008) for the case of risk averse employees in the presence of asymmetric
information. Competitive search equilibrium with risk averse workers and unobserved
worker effort is demonstrated to be constrained efﬁcient, where the rent-sharing rule
takes form of the risk adjusted Hosios (1990) condition. Here the risk adjustment is
represented by a "shadow price" of a unit output. Nevertheless, the equilibrium is dif-
ferent from the ﬁrst best social planner solution obtained in the absence of information
asymmetries, indicating that the ﬁrst best solution is not incentive compatible. The
principal difference of the unconstrained social planner solution is full income insur-
ance of the employed individuals implying a zero optimal value of bonus pay and a
trivial risk-sharing outcome. In addition, effort distortions are fully attributed to the
risk-aversion of workers, where the downward (upward) effort distortions are reported
for the low (high) shadow price of a unit output.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains an overview of the related
literature while section 3 presents notation and the model setup. Section 4 consid-
ers competitive search equilibrium with risk averse workers and incentive contracts,
which is a baseline model of the study. Section 5 compares optimal labour compen-
sation packages under different wage setting regimes. Section 6 presents an extension
of the baseline model to account for ﬁrm heterogeneity. Section 7 contains analysis of
the equilibrium efﬁciency and section 8 concludes the paper.
42 Overview of the related literature
There are a number of research directions relating this paper to the existing literature
on asymmetric information in a search equilibrium framework. Guerrieri, Shimer and
Wright (2010) consider the problem of adverse selection in search equilibrium with
risk averse agents. Principals in their model are uninformed and compete to attract
agents who are ex-anteheterogeneous and haveprivateinformationabout theirproduc-
tivity and preferences. Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010) prove that an equilibrium
exists where principals offer separating contracts: each contract posted attracts only
one type of agent, and different types direct their search to different wages. In contrast
to their study this paper investigates the problem of moral hazard in competitivesearch
equilibrium with heterogeneous risk neutral ﬁrms and homogenous risk averse agents
and therefore further extends search literature with a focus on asymmetric information.
Risk aversion in a dynamic labour market with search frictions is further studied in
a research paper by Rudanko (2009). The author develops a model of competitive
search equilibrium with limited commitment contracting, where ﬁrms face aggregate
and idiosyncratic productivity shocks and adjust wages if either of the participation
constraints of the two contracting parties is binding. Based on this model Rudanko
(2009) shows that both risk aversion and limited commitment increase volatility of
the market tightness.1 The limited commitment mechanism in this model is similar
to the state-dependent labour contract in the current study as it provides ﬁrms with
an additional labour costs ﬂexibility in the face of idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
However, the second aspect of bonus payments as a discipline device is not considered
in Rudanko (2009), while it serves as a major source of effort provision for workers in
the current study.
The group of research papers by Moen and Rosen (2006, 2008) explicitly considers
the question of efﬁciency wages in a dynamic search equilibrium, where efﬁciency
wages comprise of the base wage payment and the proﬁt-sharing bonus pay, so that
the type of incentive contract is similar to the one analyzed in the current study. Both
effort and the match-speciﬁc productivity (type) are private information of the worker,
so that the model is characterized by a combination of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion problems. Yet, as noted in Laffont and Rochet (1996), with an ex-ante risk, that
materializes before the effort decision was made, there is a possibility to eliminate the
1The lowmarkettightness volatilityin a dynamicsearchandmatchingmodelhas beenﬁrst criticized
in Shimer (2005).
5moral hazard variable(effort)and to reduce technicallythe problemto the issueof pure
adverse selection. This is in contrast to the current study where the moral hazard prob-
lem is not eliminated from the model and serves as a key motive for the risk-sharing
between workers and ﬁrms. Summarizing the results, Moen and Rosen (2006)ﬁnd that
higher powered incentive contracts increase equilibrium unemployment, while Moen
and Rosen (2008) prove that wages are more rigid and the unemployment rate is more
volatile than in the standard model without private information.
Another crucial result obtained in Moen and Rosen (2008) is the modiﬁed Hosios con-
dition for the equilibrium efﬁciency in a labour market with private information and
search frictions. Originallytheconstrainedefﬁciencyresultofcompetitivesearch equi-
librium is due to Moen (1997), this study demonstrates the way search externality can
be internalized via a wage posting mechanism, implying that ﬁrms set wages before
they meet a potential employee and therefore consider the effect of their wage choice
on unemployed workers. Moen (1997) provesthat competitivesearch equilibriumwith
risk neutral workers fulﬁlls the efﬁciency condition introduced in Hosios (1990) and
maximizes the social welfare. Moen and Rosen (2008) extend this efﬁciency result to
account for asymmetric information of market participants. They prove that incentive
power of the equilibrium wage contract is constrained efﬁcient in the absence of taxes
and unemployment beneﬁts.
The common constrained efﬁciency property of competitive search is questioned in
Guerrieri (2008). The author considers a dynamic version of competitive search with
private information on the side of the worker and ﬁnds that the equilibrium is differ-
ent from the full information allocation and inefﬁcient whenever the unemployment
rate is away from the steady state level. Further Guerrieri (2008) ﬁnds that the full
information allocation may be restored by lump-sum transfers from unemployed to
employed individuals – the generalization of the money-burning effect. Overall, this
paper highlightsimportance of money transfers and unemploymentbeneﬁts in the con-
text of search equilibrium efﬁciency. In this respect, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) are
the ﬁrst authors to provide foundations for the analysis of an optimal unemployment
insurance in a search equilibrium framework with risk averse workers. They show that
an economy with risk neutral workers achieves the maximum output without an un-
employment insurance, while an economy with risk averse workers requires a positive
levelof unemploymentinsurance to maximizeoutput. Their result is extended in Coles
and Masters (2006) to account for strategic bargaining and employment subsidies.
6Theissueof incometaxation ina search equilibriumframework isconsidered in Boone
and Bovenberg (2002), where a non lump-sum income taxation is claimed to restore
efﬁciency in a search equilibrium when the bargaining power of workers does not ful-
ﬁll the Hosios condition. Finally, the question of optimal income taxation in a search
equilibrium framework with risk averse workers and unobserved search effort is ana-
lyzed in Lehmann and Linden (2004). They show that a non-linear income taxation in
a combination with optimal unemployment insurance are sufﬁcient to decentralize the
optimal social planner solution.
3 Labour market modeling framework
In section 4 the baseline model of the study is ﬁrst introduced in a competitive search
equilibriumframeworkwherepropertiesofthelabourcontractaresetex-anteandﬁrms
compete with each other in terms of a more attractive labour compensation package.
Further in section 5 the model is compared to a classical model of moral hazard in-
troduced in a search equilibrium framework without competition. Comparison of the
two equilibria allows to study the transformation of an optimal labour compensation
package under the different wage setting regimes.
The labour market is characterized by the following properties. There is a unit mass
of inﬁnitely lived workers and an endogenous number of ﬁrms. Workers and ﬁrms are
ex-ante identical in the baseline model; the question of ﬁrm heterogeneity is addressed
in section 6. Each ﬁrm has a job position which can be either ﬁlled with a worker or
vacant and searching for a worker. Similarly, each worker can be either employed and
producing output or unemployed and searching for a job. Unemployed workers receive
a non-transferable ﬂow value of leisure z.
Employed workers choose an optimal effort level e ≥ 0. Effort is measured on a
continuous scale and is not observable to the ﬁrm. All workers are risk averse and
have an additively separable instantaneous utility function with respect to income and
effort: υ(x) − C(e), where υ(x) is an increasing and concave function of ﬂow income
x and C(e) is an increasing and convex function of effort e, such that C′(0) = 0. Here
C(e) is an effort cost function expressed in worker utility units. Firms are risk neutral.
7Matching between open vacancies and unemployed workers is modeled in the fol-
lowing way. After incurring a vacancy creation cost c the ﬁrm is entitled to post an
employment contract. Each contract contains information on the labour compensa-
tion package associated with a speciﬁc surplus value for a worker conditional on being
employed. Unemployed workers observe all posted contracts and direct their search
to particular jobs. Both unemployed workers and ﬁrms correctly anticipate the num-
ber of job matches m(u,v) and the market tightness θ = u/v associated with a spe-
ciﬁc surplus value. Here u is the number of unemployed individuals applying for jobs
promisingthis surplusvalueand v is thenumberof vacancies offering it. Thematching
function m(u,v) is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, concave, and homo-
geneous of degree 1. Then the job ﬁnding rate λ(θ) and the vacancy ﬁlling rate q(θ)








Also denote ηq = −q′(θ)θ/q(θ) – elasticity of the job ﬁlling rate q(θ), in the following
it is assumed that ηq is nondecreasing in θ.
Once employed workers choose an optimal level of effort e and start producing with
an initial ﬂow productivity y = yH. Productivity y is stochastic for every employment
relationship and the productivity shocks arrive with a Poisson arrival rate δ. Upon
the shock, the productivity variable y can take one of the two possible realizations
{yH,yL} so that the following productivity switching rule applies:
y =
(
yH with probability p(e)
yL with probability 1 − p(e)
where p(e) is an increasing concave function of effort. This means that jobs where
workers exert more effort e are characterized by longer expected durations of a high
productivity realization yH. Productivity realizations are observable and contractible,
in addition ﬁrms have an option to dismiss or retain the worker upon the low pro-
ductivity realization yL. However, it is assumed that yH is high enough to start the
employment relationship so that it is never optimal to dismiss a worker in the high
productivity state. Jobs may additionally be destroyed for exogenous reasons which
happens with a Poisson arrival rate γ.
8The paper explicitly addresses a variable wage contract with a state dependent worker
remuneration. In the case of two output states {yH,yL} the labour compensation pack-
agetakes form of(wH,wL), where wH is paid to theworker ify = yH and wL is paid if
y = yL. The vector of labour compensation (wH,wL) can be equivalently represented
as a bonus pay contract of the type (w,b) where w = wL – unconditionally paid base




wH = w + b if y = yH
wL = w if y = yL
The bonus pay labour contract described above can be viewed as an alternative to the
ﬁxed wage labour contract investigated in a complementary study by Chizhova(2007).
In a ﬁxed wage contract regime in Chizhova (2007) ﬁrms use dismissals as a discipline
device and it is the income risk between employment and unemployment that creates
incentives for workers to exert effort.
In a variablewagecontract regimeexplored in thisstudyﬁrms usebothbase wages and
bonus payments in order to provide workers with correct incentives. Bonus payments
are paid conditionally on output realizations so that it is the income risk during em-
ployment that motivates workers to exert effort. Moreover, the variable wage contract
provides ﬁrms with an additional ﬂexibility in their choice of the labour compensa-
tion package. In particular, ﬁrms posses a valuable option to adjust the base wage w
in order to avoid unproﬁtable worker dismissals in the low productivity state. In the
equilibrium ﬁrms pay a "hiring premium" as a result of the labour market competition
forcing ﬁrms to share the rents, and a "motivation premium" in order to account for
the internal moral hazard problem within the ﬁrm. The primary focus of this paper is
on an interaction between these two types of wage premia. Originally, a model with
the simultaneous rent-sharing and the problem of moral hazard has been investigated
in Demougin and Helm (2006), and Bental and Demougin (2006).
4 Bonus pay in competitive search equilibrium
This section explores a model of competitive search, where workers are risk averse,
while the ﬁrms are risk neutral. Firms set the terms of employment contract before
they meet a potential employee. This wage setting regime creates competition be-
tween ﬁrms with respect to the value of worker remuneration and permits an analysis
9of the interaction between the risk sharing and the rent sharing motives in a search
equilibrium framework. The model is set in continuous time.
4.1 Decentralized equilibrium
4.1.1 Workers: optimal effort choice
Suppose ﬁrst that in the low productivity state dismissals are not proﬁtable for the
ﬁrm, so that there is no dismissal threat for workers. The corresponding sufﬁcient
condition for this strategy is derived later in the paper. Denote W L and W H – worker
surplusvalues in thelow and high productivitystates yL and yH respectively. Similarly
let eL and eH denote worker effort choices. Bellman equations for employed and
















H) + δ(1 − p(e
H))(W
L − W
H) + γ(U − W
H)}
rU = υ(z) + λ(θ)(W
H − U) (4.1)
where notation W H = W H(wH,wL) and W L = W L(wH,wL) is used to simplify
the representation. In each of the two productivity states workers set effort so as to
balance the gain, reﬂected in δp(e)(W H − W L), and the cost of an additional unit of
effort, reﬂected in C(e). The optimal effort choice for workers is summarized in the
following lemma:
Lemma 1: Optimal effort choice is constant across productivity states eL = eH =







where d = δ/(r + γ + δ). Optimal effort e(wL,wH) is an increasing function of wH
(motivation effect) but a decreasing function of base wages wL (discouragement ef-
fect). If π′′(e) > 0 for ∀e > 0 then e(wL,wH) is a concave function of wH and a
convex function of wL. Assumption π′′(e) > 0 also implies e′′
wHwL > 0.
Proof: Appendix I.
10The above assumptions about the effort cost function C(e) and the output function
p(e) imply that π(e) is an increasing function of effort, so that a higher wage wH is
creating additional incentives for workers to exert effort. A higher wage wL produces
the opposite effect: the relative income risk wH − wL is reduced with a higher base
wage. In addition if π′′(e) > 0 for ∀e > 0 optimal effort is increasing at a declining
rate in wH and decreasing at a declining rate in wL. In the bonus payment interpreta-
tion of the labour contract lemma 1 implies e′
b > 0 and e′
w = e′
wH + e′
wL < 0. This
means that optimal effort is increasing in the bonus pay b and decreasing in the base
wage w.
DenoteRH(wH,wL,U)–workerrentsfromemploymentdeﬁnedasRH(wH,wL,U) =
W H(wH,wL)−U. The following lemma describes the properties of RH(wH,wL,U).
Lemma 2: Worker rents RH = RH(wH,wL,U) can be expressed as follows:
(r + γ)R
H = ˆ p(e)υ(w
H) + (1 − ˆ p(e))υ(w
L) − C(e) − rU,
where e = e(wH,wL) and ˆ p(e) = (r + γ + δp(e))/(r + γ + δ).
RH(wH,wL,U) is increasing in both arguments wH and wL.
Proof: Appendix I.
Expression ˆ p(e) stands for the effective probability of the high output realization yH.
In this state workers obtain the high wage ﬂow wH with a corresponding utilityυ(wH).
Similarly, 1 − ˆ p(e) stands for the probability of the wage ﬂow wL, so that the worker
rent can be expressed as a linear combination of υ(wH) and υ(wL) with the weights
being equal to the probabilities of the respective utility ﬂows. Also notice that from
Lemma 2 it follows that an increase in either wH or wL is strictly beneﬁcial for the
worker, even if effort does not adjust. In addition, workers adjust their effort in order
to maximize these gains: increase effort in response to a higher wage value wH and
decrease effort in response to a higher wage wL. This is in line with the result from
lemma 1.
Firms with an open vacancy anticipate a relationship between the posted contract
(wH,wL) and the arrival rate of workers. In order to characterize this relationship,
rewrite (4.1) in terms of the worker job-ﬁnding rate λ(θ), implicitly deﬁning the mar-





Equation (4.3) describes a functional dependence between the worker rents RH =
RH(wH,wL,U) and the market tightness θ: an increase in either of the labour com-
pensationcomponentswH and wL attractsmorejobapplicantsand hasanegativeeffect
on the job-ﬁnding rate λ(θ).
4.1.2 Firms: optimal contract
Consider the labour demand side of the market. Denote JH – ﬁrm surplus from a ﬁlled
job position in the high output state y = yH, similarly denote JL – ﬁrm surplus from a
ﬁlled job position in the low output state y = yL. Both surplus values JH and JL are
deﬁned conditionally on retaining the worker in the low productivity state. Bellman















rV = −c + q(θ)(J
H − V ) (4.4)
where JH = JH(wH,wL), JL = JL(wH,wL) and V is the ﬁrm surplus from an open




L) = ˆ p(e)(y
H − w
H) + (1 − ˆ p(e))(y
L − w
L),
meaning that the net productivity ﬂow yH − wH accrues to ﬁrms with an effective
probability ˆ p(e), while the net productivity ﬂow yL − wL accrues with an effective
probability (1 − ˆ p(e)).
Firms choose the vector of labour compensation (wH,wL) in order to maximize the
vacancy surplus V given the effort response function e(wH,wL) and the market tight-
ness response function θ(wH,wL,U) (see equations (4.2) and (4.3)):











L,U) ≥ 0 (4.6)
12Condition (4.6) is the worker participation condition, it means that workers reject job
offers with negative surplus values. Firms face the following trade-off. On the one
hand, increasing wH and wL by one unit respectively results in lower net proﬁt ﬂows
(yH − wH) and (yL − wL), but on the other hand, the job ﬁlling rate θ(wH,wL,U)
will be higher, while the optimal effort choice of workers e(wH,wL) will be lower.
Solution to the ﬁrm optimization problem is summarized in proposition 1.
Proposition 1: Competitive search equilibrium with bonus payments is characterized
by a tuple of variables {e,wH,wL,U,θ} satisfying conditions (4.2), (4.3), as well as
equations (a) and (b) below and the free entry condition V (θ(U)) = 0. The necessary
condition for the equilibrium existence is:
y
L − w
L + d(∆y − ∆w)p(e) ≥ 0 (4.7)
where e = e(wH,wL), ∆y = yH − yL and ∆w = wH − wL.
(a) The optimal value of wH is obtained from equation:







whereηˆ p ≡ −∂ ln ˆ p(e)/∂ ln(∆y−∆w) –negativeoftheelasticityoftheeffective
probability ˆ p(e) with respect to the ﬂow proﬁt difference ∆y − ∆w.
(b) The optimal value of wL is obtained from the modiﬁed Hosios condition:
J






where JH = JH(wH,wL) and RH = RH(wH,wL,U).
Proof: Appendix II.
In the following subindex "C" is attached to the tuple {e,wH,wL,U,θ} correspond-
ing to the unrestricted competitive search equilibrium with bonus payments described
in proposition 1. Equation (4.7) is a necessary condition for ﬁrms to retain workers in
case when output is low. This equation is obtained from the requirement JL > V = 0,
so that ﬁrms do not dismiss workers and continue employment relationship in the low
productivity state y = yL. This requirement is also sufﬁcient to guarantee the partici-
pation of ﬁrms as JH ≥ JL ≥ 0.
13Equation (4.8) can be interpreted as a risk sharing curve (RSS). Notice that for the
risk neutral workers with υ(w) = w, the right-hand side of equation (4.8) is zero, so
that in the equilibrium ηˆ p = 0 and ∆w = ∆y since the elasticity variable ηˆ p becomes:
ηˆ p ≡ −
∂ ln ˆ p(e)








Variable ∆w can be interpreted as an additional bonus payment in access of the base
wage wL, so that the risk neutral case corresponds to a situation where workers are not
sensitive to risk and ﬁrms set the maximum value of the bonus payment b = ∆y in
order to achieve the maximum effort. When workers are risk averse with an increas-
ing and concave utility function, the right hand side of equation (4.8) is positive as
υ′(wL) > υ′(wH), so that 0 < ηˆ p < 1 and b = ∆w < ∆y. This means that when
workers are risk averse the total productivityrisk reﬂected in ∆y is split in a proportion
[∆w,∆y − ∆w] between workers and ﬁrms respectively.





implying that in the equilibrium the ﬁrm’s and the worker’s indifference curves JH =
const and RH = const should be tangent to each other in the space (wH,wL).
Consider risk averse workers with a logarithmic utility function υ(x) = ln(x), the
risk sharing curve (RSS) can be rewritten as:
d(∆y − b)ˆ p
′(e) = ˆ p(e)(1 − ˆ p(e))bπ
′(e) (4.11)
It can be shown that for sufﬁciently low success probability ˆ p(e) ≤ 1/2 the risk shar-
ing curve (RSS) deﬁnes a positive relationship between wages and bonus payments
implying complementarity between these two variables. The probability assumption
ˆ p(e) ≤ 1/2 is sufﬁcient but not a necessary condition here. The complementarity ef-
fect can be explained by the fact that effort is decreasing in the base wage w so that the
optimal bonus should increase in order to mild the effort reduction. This effect is illus-
trated in ﬁgure 1. Also notice that as the base wage is increasing, the bonus payment b
is approaching the maximum level of ∆y.
14Equation (4.9) can be interpreted as a rent sharing curve (RNS). It deﬁnes the share












implying that in the equilibrium indifference curves U = const and V = 0 should be
tangent to each other in the space (wL,θ). As follows from the above equation the rent
sharing curve is deﬁned for wage values wH such that ∂JH/∂wH < 0 for the set of
feasible contracts. This implies that the ﬁrm surplus JH is strictly decreasing in both
arguments w = wL and b = ∆w. In order to interpret the right hand side of equation












This means that in the equilibriumwith bonus payments the modiﬁed Hosios condition
simpliﬁes to the risk-adjusted Hosios condition. It follows from the fact that the term
in brackets on the right hand side of equation (4.13) can be interpreted as an inverse
of the shadow price of a unit output for the worker. The price of a single output unit
is state-dependent, meaning that, when productivity is high and workers obtain the in-
come ﬂow w + b a unit transfer from ﬁrms to the workers results in a utility increase
υ′(w + b) which is lower than υ′(w) – utility gain for a worker in the low productivity
case. Overall the price 1/υ′(w + b) applies with a probability ˆ p(e), while the price
1/υ′(w) applies with an opposite probability.
Consider the case of risk averse workers with a logarithmic utility function described
above, the rent sharing curve then becomes:
J





As follows from lemma 2 the worker rent RH(wH,wL) is increasing in both argu-
ments. In contrast, the inverse of the shadow price w+ ˆ p(e)b is increasing in the bonus
pay b but the effect of wage w is generally ambiguous. Nevertheless, it can be shown
that for sufﬁciently low output risk ∆y (such that w+ ˆ p(e)∆y is an increasing function
of w) the worker utility gain from a higher wage expressed in terms of the ﬁrm surplus
units is increasing in w. This in turn means that the rent sharing curve is describing a
substitution effect between the wage and the bonus payments. This effect is also illus-
15trated in ﬁgure 1. The substitution effect can be explained by the fact that the market
tightness θ is decreasing in both arguments w and b so that the optimal bonus should










Figure 1: Optimal labour compensation package
The dashed curve ND on ﬁgure 1 stands for the no-dismissal condition and corre-
sponds to equation JL = 0. This means that the labour compensation packages [w,b]
outside the area given by the curve ND do not satisfy the no-dismissal condition
JL > V = 0. The equilibrium labour contract [bC,wC] obtains at the intersection
of the risk sharing curve (RSS) and the rent sharing curve (RNS) and implies risk
sharing between a ﬁrm and a worker since bC < ∆y. This is due to the fact that if
workers are risk averse ﬁrms face a trade-off between incentives provision and income
insurance. As a result the optimal bonus payment is lower than in the case of risk
neutral workers since ﬁrms provide partial income insurance to the workers. Also note
that as follows from equations (4.10), (4.12) ∂JH/∂wH < 0 along both curves (RSS
and RNS) as well as in the equilibrium. This means that ﬁrms have incentives to re-
duce the amount of the bonus pay ex-post after the vacancy is ﬁlled with a worker. The
same is true for the base wage wC, so that the ﬁrm commitment to the ex-ante labour
contract is a necessary condition for the equilibrium existence.
164.2 Limited liability constraint
Introducing a contract with state dependent wage payments wH = w + b and wL = w
in competitive search equilibrium is compatible with a situation, where the base wage
w is below the value of leisure z. In extreme cases when workers posses over sufﬁcient
exogenous income ﬂows the base wage w may even take on negative values, so that
it is also instructive to consider a restricted ﬁrm optimization problem with a wage
restriction of the type w = wL ≥ ¯ w. The wage restriction may have different origins.
One possibility to interpret a wage restriction is to view it as a limited liability con-
straint of the worker. In case when workers face exogenous ﬁnancial constraints their
job acceptance decision may additionally depend on the restriction w ≥ ¯ w, where the
¯ w may stand for a continuousoutﬂow from theworker incomecorresponding to his ex-
ogenous ﬁnancial obligation. The limited liability constraint is particularly important
in situations of moral hazard, where effort has random effect on the outcome, which
may deter economic agents from entering the contract with an unlimited liability.
Another possibility to view the wage restriction may be explained by a minimum wage
requirement on the government level or on the industry level resulting from a bargain-
ing process with trade unions. Solution to the ﬁrm optimization problem with a wage
restriction of the type wL ≥ ¯ w is summarized in proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Consider a binding wage restriction of the type wL ≥ ¯ w. The re-
stricted competitive search equilibrium with bonus payments is characterized by a tu-
ple {e,wH,wL,U,θ} satisfying wl = ¯ w, equations (4.2), (4.3), as well as the rent
sharing equation (4.9) above and the free entry condition V (θ(U)) = 0. The neces-
sary condition for the equilibrium existence is:
y
L − ¯ w + d(∆y − ∆w)p(e) > 0
where e = e(wH, ¯ w), ∆y = yH − yL and ∆w = wH − ¯ w.
Proof: Differentiate equations (4.3), (4.4) with respect to wH and use the fact that













17Equation(4.15) is equivalentto therent sharing equation (4.13). ♦
In the following subindex "CR" is attached to the tuple {e,wH, ¯ w,U,θ} character-
izing competitivesearch equilibrium with a binding limited liability constraint w ≥ ¯ w.
The restricted competitive search equilibrium is obtained at the intersection of the
rent sharing curve and the wage restriction w = ¯ w. Consider the case of risk neu-
tral workers, so that the optimal initial contract is given by [bC = ∆y,wC] and the
corresponding surplus of the unemployed workers is UC (see ﬁgure 2). In the short
term perspective, corresponding to the partial equilibrium effect, with a ﬁxed surplus
value UC restricting the base wage w = ¯ w implies a lower value of the bonus pay b so













Figure 2: Limited liability constraint in CSE: risk neutral workers
In the long run perspective corresponding to the general equilibrium effect surplus of
the unemployed workers U is decreasing, this is due to the fact that ﬁrms earn lower
proﬁts and hence less jobs are created. A lower value of U implies a downward ro-
tation of the rent sharing curve resulting in a further reduction of the incentive pay:
b(UCR, ¯ w) < b(UC,wC). Furthermore, a lower bonus value results in a lower value of
the equilibrium effort level, so that the total match surplus is lower and workers face
lower motivation incentives. Unemployed workers loose from a binding wage restric-
tion so that UC > UCR.
18Note also that a continuum of the rent sharing curves corresponding to different values







Here the ﬁrst curve JH(w,b) = 0 corresponds to the binding ﬁrm participation con-
straint denoted FPC, while the second curve ∂JH/∂b = 0 is a restricted risk sharing
condition and is investigated in more details in section 5.2. It can be shown that risk
neutrality implies a constant optimal value b∗(w) = b∗ ∀w as illustrated in ﬁgure (2).
This result implies that the optimal bonus value bCR is bounded in the following way:
∆y = bC ≥ bCR ≥ b∗ meaning that a binding wage restriction induces risk sharing
between workers and ﬁrms even if workers are risk neutral.
5 Search equilibrium with ex-post wage setting
5.1 Decentralized equilibrium: comparison
In order to illustrate the effect of the ex-ante wage setting mechanism on the equilib-
rium labour contract and to be able to decompose wages into the motivation and the
hiring premia, consider a labour market with an ex-post wage setting regime. The ex-
post wage setting regime arises in labour markets where job advertisements are not
informative about the size of the labour compensation. In the presence of labour mar-
ket uncertainty unemployed workers can not direct their search towards the better paid
jobs, while ﬁrms don’t need to account for the effect of wages on the number of job ap-
plications and market tightness θ. The optimal strategy of the ﬁrm is then to maximize
the job surplus JH with respect to wH and wL subject to the worker incentive compat-
ibility constraint (4.2) and the worker participation constraint R(wH,wL,U) ≥ 0. The














L,U) ≥ 0 and e = e(w
H,w
L). (5.1)
In the ex-post wage setting regime there are no incentives for ﬁrms to leave rents to
the workers, as any wage offer delivering a non-negative rent to the worker will be ac-
cepted. This means that in the equilibrium, it should be true that RH(wH,wL,U) = 0.
Zero worker rents in the equilibrium imply a monopsonistic type of the market, where
ﬁrms obtain the full match surplus, and therefore the equilibrium with an ex-post wage
19setting resembles properties of the Diamond (1971) equilibrium. The paradox of the
Diamond equilibrium is that the monopsony outcome obtains as long as the search
costs of workers are positive. Competitiveequilibrium outcome in the Diamond model
does not arise even when the search costs of workers are arbitrarily small and the num-
ber of ﬁrms is sufﬁciently large.
In addition notice, that the search equilibrium with an ex-post wage setting is a di-
rect extension of a classical contract theory solution for the optimal bonus pay in the
presence of moral hazard (as a reference see Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Bolton
andDewatripont(2005)). Theextensioninvolvesintroducingtheclassicalcontractthe-
ory model with bonus payments in a general equilibrium framework where the labour
market is characterized by search frictions. However, the (ex-post) wage setting mech-
anismispreserved unchanged. Solutionto theﬁrm optimizationproblemintheex-post
wage setting regime is summarized in proposition 3.
Proposition 3: The search equilibrium with bonus payments and ex-post wage setting
is characterizedbya tuple{e,wH,wL,U,θ} satisfyingequations(4.2), rU = υ(z), the
risk sharing equation (4.8) as well as equation (a) below and the free entry condition
V (θ) = 0.







L) − U = 0 (5.2)
Proof: Appendix III.
In the following subindex "P" is attached to the tuple {e,wH,wL,U,θ} characteriz-
ingthe search equilibriumwithbonus paymentsundertheex-postwage settingregime.
The search equilibrium with the ex-post wage setting is obtained at the intersection of
the risk sharing curve (4.8) and the worker participation constraint RH(wH,wL,U) =
0 denoted WPC. In case when workers are risk neutral the risk sharing condition
again implies b = ∆y. The base wage w is then set according to the worker partici-
pation constraint RH(wH,wL,U) = 0. When the value of the bonus payment is zero
there are no incentives for ﬁrms to set the base wage w above the reservation value z.
This is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. Notice also that the equilibrium implies wP < z mean-
ing that companies use both the award based motivation reﬂected in bP > 0 and the
20punishment based motivation reﬂected in wP −z < 0. The motivationpremium in this
case can be expressed as bP, while the motivation penalty is wP − z.
In addition the rent sharing equation (4.9) implies RH(wH
C,wL
C,UC) > 0 in the com-
petitive search equilibrium with bonus payments. This is different under the ex-post
wage setting regime, where in the equilibrium it is true that RH(wH
P ,wL
P,UP) =
0. This means that the rent sharing curve in competitive search equilibrium is situ-
ated above the participation constraint in the space (b,w). This result also takes ac-
count of the fact that UC > UP, which follows from the inequality rUC = υ(z) +
λ(θC)RH(wH
C,wL
C,UC) > υ(z) = rUP. This result implies that unemployed workers
are strictly better off in competitive search equilibrium where wages are set ex-ante as


















Figure 3: Optimal contracts under ex-post vs. ex-ante wage setting. Left: risk neutral
workers. Right: risk averse workers
Now compare the equilibrium labour contracts wC,bC vs. wP,bP under respectively
theax-ante and the ex-post wage setting. This comparisonis also illustrated in ﬁgure 3.
When workers are risk neutral the optimal bonus payment is equal in both types of the
labour market, namely bC = bP = ∆y, so that the motivationpremia are also the same.
However, the optimal wages are different, in particular it is true that wC > wP, imply-
ing that ﬁrms in competitive search equilibrium pay an additional hiring premium to
theiremployees. If workers are risk aversewith alogarithmicutilityfunctiondescribed
above it is true that bC > bP and wC > wP, so that both expressions bC − bP > 0 and
wC − wP > 0 stand for the hiring premia in competitive search equilibrium.
215.2 Limited liability constraint
As follows from the above analysis, unrestricted search equilibria with risk neutral
workers always yield the maximum value of the bonus pay b = ∆y so that in the
equilibrium there is no risk sharing between workers and ﬁrms. However, this is not
the case if a wage restriction, explained by the limited liability or the minimum wage
requirement is binding. This section considers properties of the search equilibrium
with an ex-post wage setting and a binding wage constraint. In the presence of a wage
restriction the optimal strategy of the ﬁrm is then to maximize the job surplus JH with
respecttowH andwL subjecttothewageconstraint,theworkerincentivecompatibility
constraint (4.2)and the worker participationconstraint. Theﬁrm optimizationproblem











s.t. w ≥ ¯ w, R
H(w
H,w
L,U) ≥ 0 and e = e(w
H,w
L)
Solution to this optimization problem is presented in proposition 4.
Proposition 4: Consider a binding wage restriction of the type w ≥ ¯ w. The restricted
search equilibrium with bonus payments and ex-post wage setting is characterized by
a tuple {e,b,w,U,θ} satisfying requirements w = ¯ w, (4.1), (4.2) as well as the free
entry condition V (θ) = 0; the optimal bonus payment is obtained as b = max(b∗,b∗∗),
where b∗ is solution to ηˆ p = 1, which can be written as:




b = ˆ p(e), where e = e(b, ¯ w) (5.3)
and b∗∗ is obtained from the worker participation constraint R( ¯ w,b∗∗,U) = 0.
Proof: Appendix III.
In the following subindex "PR" is attached to the tuple {e,wH,wL,U,θ} character-
izing the restricted search equilibrium with bonus payments under the ex-post wage
setting regime.
Equation (5.3) can be interpreted as a restricted risk sharing condition (see ﬁgure 4).
It comes from the ﬁrms ﬁrst order condition ∂JH/∂b = 0 and deﬁnes the risk sharing
proportions between a ﬁrm and a worker. Note that, if workers are risk neutral the
22optimal effort is independent of the wage ¯ w, so that equation (5.3) produces a ﬁxed
value of the bonus pay b∗ < ∆y. However, if ¯ w and the corresponding value b∗( ¯ w) are
not sufﬁcient to fulﬁll the worker participation constraint denoted WPC and to pro-
vide workers with a necessary job rent, the ﬁrm will increase the optimal bonus pay to
the point where workers are just indifferent between working and staying unemployed,









Figure 4: Limited liability in SE with ex-post wage setting; risk neutral workers
6 Heterogeneous capital intensity
This part of the paper presents extensions of the models in sections 4 and 5 for the
case of heterogeneous jobs. Suppose that the ﬁrm entry mechanism is as follows.
Firms pay an ex-ante capital investment K in order to enter the market, the capital
investment is irreversible. Upon entry each ﬁrm draws a ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital intensity
k from distribution F(k) with the range of capital intensity values [k,k]. Assume that
the minimal capital intensity value k is sufﬁcient for the ﬁrm to stay in the market, so





The capital intensity distributioncreates ex-post productivity diversity in the economy.
Capital is included into the model in a multiplicative way, so that the worker produc-




where ∆a = aH − aL > 0 and f(k) is a standard production function in the intensive
form, increasing and concave in k. This approach creates productive heterogeneity
among jobs, where ceteris paribus jobs with a higher capital stock intensity are char-
acterized by a higher expected output ﬂow m(k), but also face a higher variance of the
output σ2(k) and a higher risk ∆y = ∆af(k):
(
m(k) = (aL + ∆aˆ p(e))f(k)
σ2(k) = ˆ p2(e)(1 − ˆ p(e))2f2(k)∆a2
In order to make a reference about the correlation between wages and bonus payments
in this economy consider two jobs with capital intensities k2 > k1 ∈ [k,k]. Both ﬁrms
face the same worker participation constraint RH(k) = RH(wL(k),wH(k),U) ≥ 0,
where the unemployed worker surplus value U = U(k) ∀k is now obtained from:
rU = υ(z) + λ(θ(k))R
H(k) (6.1)
However, the two risk-sharing curves faced by ﬁrms are different due to the fact that
∆y(k2) > ∆y(k1). As follows from the risk sharing equation (4.8) the optimal bonus
payment b(k) = ∆w(k) is an increasing function of ∆y, so that the risk sharing curve
of the more capital intensive ﬁrm is situated above the corresponding curve of the less
capital intensive ﬁrm. This result is illustrated in ﬁgure 5. Notice that equilibrium
contracts in the search equilibrium framework with an ex-post wage setting regime are
obtained at the intersection between the worker participation constraint and the risk
sharing curve, so that it can be concluded that wL(k2) < wL(k1) and b(k2) > b(k1).
The more capital intensive ﬁrm is more productive in expectation so that the marginal
gain of a unit effort increase is larger in this ﬁrm compared to the less productive ﬁrm.
In order to achieve a higher effort level the ﬁrm sets optimally a higher value of bonus
pay b(k2) and a lower value of the base wage wL(k2). Note, that both actions lead to
an increase in the worker effort. The lower value of the base wage also guarantees that
the worker participation constraint is binding. Overall, the search equilibrium with an
ex-post wage setting regime exhibits the substitution effect between wages and bonus
payments and fails to account for the complementarity effect observed in a number of












Figure 5: SE with ex-post wage setting and heterogeneous jobs
In competitive search equilibrium both ﬁrms face the same labour supply equation
(6.1) in the space [θ,wL] for a given bonus pay value ∆w. It can also be interpreted as
workers’ indifference curve. This follows from worker homogeneity in the economy
and is represented by a convex decreasing curve in ﬁgure 6. The curve is decreasing
since workers prefer both high wages and high market tightness. However, each ﬁrm
is maximizing an individual vacancy surplus expression V (k) = −c + q(θ)(JH(k) −






L + ˆ p(e)(∆y(k) − ∆w)
JobsurplusJH(yL(k),∆y(k))isincreasinginbothargumentsyL(k)and∆y(k),mean-
ing that the more capital intensive ﬁrm produces more output in the low productivity
state yL(k) and also enjoys a larger output increase ∆y(k) if the high productivitystate
is realized. Both vacancy surplus equations for the two ﬁrms are represented by con-
cave decreasing curves in the space [θ,wL] and are illustrated in ﬁgure 6. These curves
can also be interpreted as iso-proﬁts curves. Both curves are decreasing since ﬁrms
prefer both low wages and low market tightness.
Concavity of the iso-proﬁt curve and convexity of the worker’s indifference curve are
guaranteed by the assumption of the increasing elasticity of the job ﬁlling rate ηq with
respect to the market tightness θ. For a ﬁxed value of ∆y(k), the more capital inten-
sive ﬁrm faces a ﬂatter indifference curve V (k2) = const, this means that the optimal












Figure 6: Market tightness in CSE with heterogeneous jobs
difference in risk variables ∆y(k) between the two ﬁrms implies a further rotation of
the ﬁrm indifference curve and strengthens the preceding result. The intuition behind
this result is such that the more capital intensive ﬁrm faces larger search costs in terms
of forgone output value and so the ﬁrm is more willing to trade off the low wages for
low labour market tightness.
For the rent-sharing curve (RNS) the fact that wL(k2) > wL(k1) for every value of
b = ∆w implies an upward shift in the space [b,w], so that the rent-sharing curve
of the more capital intensive ﬁrm is situated above the corresponding curve of the less
capital intensiveﬁrm. This is illustratedin ﬁgure 7. The reason for this shift is twofold:
due to the larger values of yL(k2) and ∆y(k2). More capital intensive ﬁrms are more
productive,obtainhigherrentsJH(k2)−V (k2)andsharetheserentswiththeiremploy-
ees. Firms lose from higher labour costs, both in terms of wages and bonus payments,
but gain from a higher job ﬁlling rate q(θ). Note that for the ﬁxed risk-sharing curve
the rent-sharing motive implies complementarity between bonus payments and wages
in the case of risk averse workers.
Consider the difference in the risk sharing curves. As already described above in the
case of ex-post wage setting, both ﬁrms face different risk-sharing curves, where the
RSS curve for k2 is situated above the corresponding curve for k1. Here the more
productive ﬁrm substitutes wages for bonus payments and gains from an unambigu-
ously higher worker effort. Overall, optimal contract comparison of the two ﬁrms with





















Figure 7: Competitive search equilibrium with heterogeneous jobs. Left: risk neutral
workers. Right: risk averse workers
ﬁrm will unambiguously offer a larger value of the bonus payment b(k2), which has
a positive effect both on the optimal worker effort and on the ﬁrm hiring rate. The
effect of capital differences on base wages is however ambiguous, it is more likely
to be positive if the slope of the risk sharing curve is close to 1 in the relevant range
of capital intensities [k,k]. Also notice that in the case of homogeneous variation in
output (∆y(k) = const ⇒ ∂∆y/∂k = 0) the baseline model of the paper with risk
averse workers unambiguously predicts positive cross-sectional correlation between
bonus payments and wages.
Summarizing, in the presence of jobs heterogeneity competitive search equilibrium
with bonus payments extends the classical contract theory approach with ex-post wage
setting by explaining the sources of cross-sectional complementarity between bonus
payments and wages. This complementarity effect is based on the rent sharing mecha-
nism between the ﬁrm and the worker inherent in the ex-ante wage setting regime.
7 Social welfare and constrained efﬁciency
This section considers welfare properties of competitive search equilibrium with risk
averse workers and bonus payments. As mentioned in the introduction, with respect to
the social planner solution this paper can be seen as a generalization of the equilibrium
efﬁciency result presented in Moen and Rosen (2008) in competitive search equilib-
rium with risk averse workers in the presence of asymmetric information. However,
the social planner optimization problem is investigated in the absence of income taxes
27and unemployment beneﬁts, so that the main research question raised in this section
is whether the wage contracts chosen by ﬁrms are socially optimal given the optimal
worker behaviorand the free entry of ﬁrms. Two informationalsettingsare considered:
ﬁrst, the unconstrained social planner optimization problem (ﬁrst best) is analyzed,
where the effort choice of workers is assumed to be observable by the social planner,
then the constrained social planner solution is compared to the ﬁrst best solution.
Consider a social planner implementing a state dependent wage contract with wages
wL and wH in respective productivity states yL and yH. The utilitarian social planner
is maximizing the present discounted value of a sum of utility ﬂows of the unemployed
and employed individuals. In the ﬁrst best case the choice variables of the social plan-
ner can be represented as a tuple of variables {e,wH,wL,θ}, so that the planner’s















H) = ˆ p(e)υ(w
H) + (1 − ˆ p(e))υ(w
L) − C(e)
Variable ˆ υ(e,wL,wH) denotes utility ﬂow of the employed individual working un-
der the wage contract wL,wH and exerting e units of effort. The unemployment rate
evolves according to the following differential equation:
˙ u = (1 − u)γ − uλ(θ)
The planner’s resource constraint can be summarized as follows:









Equation (7.1) implies that the planner’s budget is balanced and the monetary outﬂow
for maintaining the vacancies on the left hand side equals the monetary inﬂow from
the ﬁlled jobs on the right hand side of this equation. The social planner optimization
programme is solved using a current-value Hamiltonian approach. Solution to this
optimization programme is presented in proposition 5.
28Proposition 5: Consider a social planner implementing a variable wage contract.
The unconstrained (ﬁrst best) social planner solution is characterized by a tuple of
variables {e,wH,wL,θ,U} satisfying condition wH = wL, the reservation utility
equation (4.1), the job creation condition c = q(θ)JH(wH,wL), as well as equations
(a) and (b) below.

















As follows from proposition 5 the unconstrained social planner optimally sets wH =
wL. This means that the optimal bonus payment b is set to zero, implying income
insurance for workers against productivity shocks. Having guaranteed income stabil-
ity for the employed population the social planner chooses an optimal effort level by
maximizing the total surplus of a ﬁlled job. This is given by equation (7.2), where the
left hand side of equation stands for the social gain of increasing the effort, while the
right hand side can be interpreted as a marginal loss. The social loss C′(e) is directly
estimated in worker utility units, while the social gain is estimated as an increase in
the expected productivity ﬂow dp′(e)∆y multiplied by the respective shadow price of
an output unit, represented by the term υ′(w).
Notice that the optimal effort equation of a social planner (eq. 7.2) is different from
the worker incentive compatibility constraint (4.2). Here the social cost of increas-
ing effort C′(e) coincides with a private cost of the employee, however the social gain
dp′(e)∆yυ′(w) is generally different from a privategainof the employee, which can be




L), x0 > w
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Then competitive search equilibrium with risk averse workers, unobserved effort and
bonus payments entails a downward effort distortion with respect to the ﬁrst best out-
29come if w < x0, otherwise if w > x0 effort is biased upward. Intuitively, if w is less
than x0, the shadow price of a single output unit is high, so that the social gain ex-
pressed in worker utility units is higher than the private gain of a worker, as a result the
social planner will demand more effort from workers compared to the decentralized
equilibrium with risk averse workers and unobserved effort values. The opposite holds
when w > x0, in this case the social gain converted into worker utility units is lower
than the private gain of a worker and therefore the ﬁrst best effort level is lower than
effort in a decentralized equilibrium.
In addition, it should also be noted that effort distortions are purely attributed to the
risk aversion of workers. If workers are risk neutral, the social gain of exerting ef-
fort expressed as dp′(e)∆y coincides with a private gain of a worker dp′(e)b. This is
the case because ﬁrms in a decentralized equilibrium optimally choose the maximum
bonus payment value b = ∆y (see proposition 1). This, however, does not imply that
the ﬁrst best social planner solution with risk neutral workers may be decentralized by
the market. The reason is that the maximum effort value is not compatible with a zero
bonus payment when effort is unobserved.
Now consider the second best solution where the social planner is constrained by the
information asymmetries arising from the unobserved worker effort choice. In this
case the social planner is maximizing the present discounted value of a sum of utility
ﬂows of the unemployed and employed individualswith respect to the choice variables














where ˜ υ is given above. In addition, the worker incentive compatibility constraint
(equation 4.2), as well as the budget constraint of the social planner and the unemploy-
ment dynamics equation should be fulﬁlled. The result of this optimization problem is
summarized in proposition 6.
Proposition 6: Consider a social planner implementing a variable wage contract.
The constrained (second best) social planner solution is characterized by a tuple of
variables {e,wH,wL,θ,U} satisfying the reservation utility equation (4.1), the job
creation conditionc = q(θ)JH(wH,wL), theworker incentive compatibilityconstraint
30(4.2), as well as the risk-sharing equation (4.8) and the rent-sharing equation (4.9).
Therefore, competitive search equilibrium with bonus payments and unobserved effort
is constrained efﬁcient.
Proof: Appendix IV.
Proposition 6 characterizes the major properties of the constrained social planner solu-
tion. It follows that the set of ﬁve equations describing the optimal solution of a social
planner coincides with the set of equations in a decentralized competitive search equi-
libriumwithunobserved effort and bonus payments. This means that thesocial planner
willchooseexactlythesameoptimalpackageoflabourcompensation(wL,wH) result-
ing in the same effort level of the employed and the same market tightness variable θ.
Therefore, it can be concluded that competitive search equilibrium with risk averse
workers, bonus payments and unobserved effort is constrained efﬁcient.
8 Conclusions
This paper develops a model of competitive search with risk averse workers in the
presence of asymmetric information. Information asymmetries arise from the fact that
workers possess private information about their effort choice on the job. The moral
hazard problem within a match forces ﬁrms to use motivation devices such as the
bonus pay in order to provide workers with the correct working incentives. This setup
creates in a situation where the equilibrium labour contract entails both a hiring and a
motivationwage premia. Thehiringpremium resultsfrom therent-sharing incentiveof
ﬁrms ensuring them a sufﬁcient job-ﬁlling rate, while the motivation premium results
from the ﬁrm’s risk-sharing incentive necessary to guarantee a sufﬁcient effort level.
The baseline model of the paper is compared to the classical model of moral haz-
ard extended to account for labour market search frictions but preserving the essence
of the ex-post wage setting mechanism. This benchmark model is proved to predict
a lower amount of the bonus pay than the baseline model with wage competition be-
tween employers. Similarly, both models are compared in the presence of a wage
restriction imposed to reﬂect a binding limited liability constraint or a minimum wage
requirement.
31Furthermore, the paper presents an extension of the competitive search model with
bonus payments to account for jobs heterogeneity. In particular, jobs are allowed to
differ with respect to their capital endowments affecting both the expectation and the
variationofoutput. Therent-sharingmotiveforcesmorecapitalintensiveﬁrmstoleave
higher rents to their employees. The higher rent comes in the form of a higher base
wage as well as a higher bonus pay values. This complementarity effect provides ra-
tionale for the positive cross-sectional correlation between bonus payments and wages
reported in a number of empirical studies. The rent-sharing motive is absent in the
model with an ex-post wage setting so that bonus payments and wages act as substi-
tutes in a cross-section of ﬁrms. Based on the above theoretical analysis this paper
concludes that the correlation between bonus payments and wages is speciﬁc to the
type and the structure of the labour market. This is also in line with the observed em-
pirical evidence.
Finally, this paper considers efﬁciency implications of incentive contracts in a com-
petitive search equilibrium. The equilibrium is proved to be constrained efﬁcient in
the absence of tax payments and unemployment beneﬁts. Nevertheless, competitive
search equilibrium with bonus payments does not coincide with the full information
allocation of the social planner. This is due to the fact that the private gain from ex-
erting effort is different from the social gain, so that in the full information allocation
the social planner will demand a different effort level from workers compared to the
decentralized equilibrium.
9 Appendix
APPENDIX I: Proof of lemmas 1-2.














L) = 0 (9.2)













which proves equation (4.2). Differentiate equation (4.2) with respect to wH to obtain
e′
wH > 0. Similarly, differentiate equation (4.2) with respect to wL to obtain e′
wL < 0.
The second order derivatives e′′
wLwH, e′′
wHwL and e′′

































e)3 > 0 if π
′′
e > 0




L) = ˆ p(e)υ(w
H) + (1 − ˆ p(e))υ(w
L) − C(e) − rU
where ˆ p(e) = (r + γ + δp(e))/(r + γ + δ). Differentiate RH(wH,wL) with respect to
wH and wL and apply the envelope theorem to obtain: ∂RH(wH,wL)/∂wH > 0 and
∂RH(wH,wL)/∂wL > 0.
Appendix II: Proof of proposition 1.
Differentiate equations (4.3), (4.4) with respect to wH and wL and use the fact that







where RH = RH(wH,wL,U) and JH(wH,wL). Differentiate JH(wH,wL) with re-
spect to both arguments to obtain:
(r + γ)
∂JH
∂wH = ˆ p
′(e)(∆y − ∆w)e
′
wH − ˆ p(e)
(r + γ)
∂JH
∂wL = ˆ p
′(e)(∆y − ∆w)e
′
wL − (1 − ˆ p(e))
33Insert expressions for ∂RH/∂wH, ∂RH/∂wL, ∂JH/∂wH and ∂JH/∂wL into (9.5):
ˆ p(e)υ′(wH)
(1 − ˆ p(e))υ′(wL)
=
ˆ p′(e)(∆y − ∆w)e′
wH − ˆ p(e)
ˆ p′(e)(∆y − ∆w)e′
wL − (1 − ˆ p(e))
Insert expressions e′
wH = dυ′(wH)/π′(e) and e′
wL = −dυ′(wL)/π′(e) to obtain equa-















Insert expressions for ∂JH/∂wL, ∂RH/∂wL to obtain the risk-adjusted Hosios condi-
tion (4.9).
Appendix III: Proof of propositions 3-4.
In the search equilibrium with ex-post wage setting the ﬁrm is maximizing it’s sur-
plus with respect to the wage value wH given that the wage wL is adjusting according










where λu stands for the Lagrange multiplier. The ﬁrst order conditions for this opti-








∂wL = 0 (9.7)
λuR(w
H,w
L,U) = 0 (9.8)
where the last equation represents a complementary slackness condition. In the unre-
stricted ﬁrm optimization problem with the ex-post wage setting the worker participa-
tion constraint is binding, which means that λu  = 0, while R(wH,wL,U) = 0. Then
equations (9.6) - (9.7) can be rearranged to produce the risk sharing curve given by
equation (4.10).
34Now consider the restricted ﬁrm optimization problem with a binding limited lia-





H, ¯ w) + λRR
H(w
H, ¯ w,U)
where λR stands for the Lagrange multiplier. The ﬁrst order condition for this opti-




∂wH = 0 (9.9)
λRR(w
H,w
L,U) = 0 (9.10)
where the last equation stands for the complementary slackness condition. If the
worker participation constraint is not binding then λR = 0 and the optimal bonus
payment is given by ∂JH/∂wH = 0 implying that:




b = ˆ p(e), where e = e(b, ¯ w)
which is the restricted risk sharing condition (5.3). Solution to this equation is denoted
by b∗. If the worker participation constraint is binding meaning that b∗ is too low, then
λR  = 0, so that the optimal bonus payment b∗∗ is given by equation R(b∗∗, ¯ w,U) = 0.
Overall, the optimal bonus payment is given by: bPR = max(b∗,b∗∗).
Appendix IV: Proof of propositions 5-6.
The current value Hamiltonian for the unconstrained planner problem (ﬁrst best) is:
H = uυ(z) + (1 − u)ˆ υ(w
L,w
H,e) − γu[(1 − u)γ − uλ(θ)]
+ α
￿








where α is a Lagrange multiplier and γu is a costate variable corresponding to u. The
optimal social planner solution must satisfy:
∂H
∂u
= −rγu ⇒ αJ
H + R
H = γu (9.11)
35Maximizing H with respect to e, wH, wL and θ yields:
∂H
∂e
= 0 ⇒ d[(∆y − ∆w)α + ∆υ] = π
′(e) (9.12)
∂H









= 0 ⇒ γu(1 − ηq)q(θ) = cα (9.15)
where ∆w = wH − wL and ∆υ = υ(wH) − υ(wL). Equations (9.13)-(9.14) imply
wH = wL and α = υ′(w) – shadow price of an output unit. These results transform









Consider the current value Hamiltonian function for the constrained social planner
problem (second best). Denote µ – Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the budget
constraint of the social planner, and γc – a costate variable corresponding to u. The
optimal social planner solution in this case must satisfy:
∂H
∂u
= −rγc ⇒ µJ
H + R
H = γc (9.16)
∂H
∂wH = 0 ⇒ ˆ p(e) − dp
′(e)e
′





∂wL = 0 ⇒ (1 − ˆ p(e))
υ′(wL)
µ
= 1 − p(e) − dp
′(e)e
′
wL(∆y − ∆w) (9.18)
∂H
∂θ
= 0 ⇒ γc(1 − ηq)q(θ) = cµ (9.19)
The ratio of equations (9.17),(9.18) can be rearranged to produce equation (4.8). In
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